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Until recently it was undisputed that economic development is the more successful  
- the more extensive the privatisation of production;  
- the more strongly the state is willing to protect private property rights  
(e.g. North 1981). A powerful justification for the privatisation of common goods and strong 
private property rights was given by Garret Hardin`s (1968) metaphor of the “tragedy of the 
commons”. This metaphor highlights the problems of overuse and undersupply of common 
resources. Under certain conditions it might be necessary to change the metaphor to “tragedy 
of the anti-commons” (Michelman 1982, Heller 1998), in which scattered owners have the 
right to exclude others from a scarce resource while no one has an efficient right to use it. If 
the transaction costs to bundle the property rights are too high, such a resource is prone to 
underuse. This problem might even be worse in the case of intellectual property rights, e.g. in 
biomedical research (Heller/Eisenberg 1998) and the software industry. This was empirically 
tested in a natural experiment (Bessen/Maskin 2000). Before 1980, patent protection for 
software was very limited in the United States, as it still is in the EU today. A series of court 
decisions in the early 1980´s extended patent protection considerably. Consequently the 
number of issued patents increased. However, in contrast to what was expected, R&D 
expenditures relative to sales in relevant samples of the software and software related 
industries dropped significantly. The question arises under which conditions private 
ownership of intellectual property rights in effect hinders innovation and when state 
regulators should be careful in proliferating patent rights.  
Employing the example of one of the most innovative industries, open source software 
production, we study these conditions. Open source software production is an innovation 
model which is characterized by  
a)  (partly) public ownership of intellectual property, and 
b)  user driven distributed innovation. 
Some projects like e.g. Linux and Apache managed to attract huge communities of 
contributors in which intrinsically and extrinsically motivated members voluntarily work    3     
 
together in a complementary manner.
1 Since open source projects have no clear group and 
resource boundaries, nor does there exist a central formal authority, the development and 
maintenance of such communities depends on their ability to 
c)  develop and enforce rules of cooperation in a self-organized manner, and to 
d)  develop self-enforcing swift trust which is based on generalized reciprocity 
between group members. 
Open source software is the best known but by far not the only example of this 
innovation model. Other examples are the NASA Clickworkers (a project where volunteers 
mark and classify craters on maps of Mars), Slashdot (a site with “News for Nerds” where 
users can post submissions, comment on their content and classify the comments themselves 
as to their helpfulness) and Project Gutenberg (peer-based distribution of books that includes 
volunteer scanning of hard copies and proofreading) (Benkler 2002). Studying open source 
software helps us to understand why and when private ownership of intellectual property 
rights should be proliferated carefully. Even though the creation of rules in open source 
communities is largely self-organized, state regulators are heavily involved. Thus the 
endeavour of this paper is threefold. Firstly, it studies how trust is developed and sustained in 
such virtual communities of innovation. Secondly, we analyze under what conditions 
intellectual communities are able to develop and put through their own governance rules. 
Thirdly, it identifies conditions under which private intellectual property rights can hinder 
innovations. We show that state-imposed private property rights can dramatically impede this 
process. State intervention thus may solve one tragedy but cause another. 
In the second section of this paper, a short overview of the characteristics of open 
source software is provided. The third section distinguishes various types of actors in open 
source software production according to their motivation to contribute to this kind of 
software. The fourth section discusses the role of trust in overcoming a first and second order 
social dilemma arising in situations of public good production. We argue that only projects 
that can be trusted to be able to solve both the first and second order social dilemma are 
attractive for potential new members and can thus hope to attract a large community. We 
show that on both levels of the social dilemma, trust based on encapsulated interests (R. 
Hardin 2002) is not sufficient, but that swift trust based on the existence of a sufficient 
number of intrinsically motivated contributors is needed. In section five, we analyse under 
what conditions this is possible. We show that low cost situations and appropriate 
                                                 
1 Unfortunately not all projects are thus successful. As an empirical study by Krishnamurthy (2002) shows, 
many projects indeed dismally fail in this endeavour.    4     
 
institutional arrangements that do not destroy intrinsic motivation are essential for building 
trust that makes “virtual communities of innovation” work without central authorities and 
privatisation of intellectual property rights, even when no clear group and resource 
boundaries exist. We then go on to show how state regulation might adversely affect the open 
source innovation model by turning low cost into high cost situations. It is concluded that 
considering the complex interplay of motivational, situational, institutional and regulatory 
factors, trust and motivation issues should be given more weight in designing property rights. 
Managers and policy makers should be aware that the first best policy not always is to blindly 
apply orthodox economics. Rather, they should consider the variety and interplay of existing 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivations and establish conditions under which self-governed 
“communities of innovation” based on trust can emerge and be sustained.  
 
2. What is open source software?  
Open source is a collective term for software licences that give the user the right to read the 
source code of the software. Users are also allowed to change the source code and to publish 
these amendments with the original or the changed source code. Furthermore, one is not 
allowed to raise any licence fees or other fees for the source code. The open source software 
code thus constitutes a public good in the classical sense. Linux, Apache and Sendmail are 
three of the most famous examples of this very successful innovation model. Linux as a 
server operating environment already holds 13.7% of the $50.9 billion market for server 
computers. This share is expected to rise even further during the next years (Businessweek 
2003). In January 2003 the open source web server Apache was used by over 65% of active 
servers across all domains. It received many industry awards for excellence.
2 Sendmail routes 
at least 42% of mails in the Internet. In comparison, Microsoft as the closest competitor only 
holds a market share of 18%.
3 SourceForge.net, a repository of open source projects, lists 
more than 50.000 projects and more than 550.000 registered users.
4 
To explain the success of the new innovation model, one must take into consideration 
three interlinked characteristics that ensure an efficient concurrence of design and testing in 
open source software production. These characteristics, which make open source programs 
                                                 
2 http://www.netcraft.co.uk/Survey/  
3 http://www.dwheeler.com/oss_fs_why.html 
4 http://sourceforge.net      5     
 
more innovative and robust than proprietary programs (Kogut/Metiu 2001), will be discussed 
in turn: 
a) Open source software is produced under licences that assure (partly) public 
ownership by allowing:  
•  to read and have access to the software’s source code as a necessary first step before 
one can change it, 
•  to make copies and to distribute those copies, 
•  to modify the program and distribute modified versions. In the special case of the 
GNU General Public License, the modified versions have to be published under the 
same terms as the original software (Stallman 1999). 
The various open source licences differ to the extent to which they allow public 
property to be mixed with private property rights. One of the most far reaching is the GNU 
General Public Licence (GPL). It forces every program that contains a free software 
component to be released in its entirety as free software. In contrast to the conventional 
copyright, this licence is called “copyleft”. It “infects” the open source software with a 
“virus” to enforce compliance to the copyleft. Thus, it is ensured that any derived software 
will remain a public good. Other licenses, like Apache’s, allow programmers to make their 
modifications private and distribute them as proprietary products. This blending of open and 
proprietary source, however, is sometimes condemned as a threat to the ideals of the open 
source community (Stallman 1999).  
b) User driven distributed knowledge production in rapid feedback cycles implements 
concurrence in design and testing of software modules and thus enables a very efficient new 
product development process. In traditional software production, the software is usually sold 
in a form giving no access to the source code. Customers therefore have only limited 
possibilities to detect mistakes (“debugging”) and to improve the program. They can only 
give feedback to the seller about any malfunctions. In contrast, in open source software 
production, program innovations are disclosed to the users. A large audience tests the 
program, debugs it during use and gives immediate feedback. This is the reason why open 
source software is considered to have a lower defect density than proprietary software: “given 
enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow” (Raymond 2001). The user driven rapid feedback 
cycles work not only with debugging but also with the production of whole modules. These 
are contributions to the source code which are published and reviewed by peers before they 
become part of the next release of the software. This new production model beyond    6     
 
traditional markets and hierarchies was characterized by Raymond (2001) as a “bazaar” in 
contrast to a “cathedral”.  
c) Successful open source projects form voluntary “virtual communities of innovation”
5. 
Following Tönnies (1920) communities are defined as groups of people whose actions are geared 
towards a collective goal. This differentiates communities from societies, which are abstract 
entities and in which interactions are characterized by the rational pursuit of individualized goals. 
In contrast, membership in a community is based on a feeling of belonging and shared values. This 
firstly ensures intensive network embeddedness based on a strong common culture. Secondly the 
members of these communities have a common know how on an expert level without having face-
to face-interaction. In contrast to proprietary software, the users of open source software are often 
more sophisticated. Thirdly, Benkler (2002) argues that in virtual communities of innovation, 
transaction costs of matching talents to tasks can be reduced dramatically compared to market or 
hierarchical modes of organization. Individuals can judge for themselves in which tasks their 
talents might be put to most efficient use. This voluntary matching not only avoids information 
losses which are characteristic for market transactions and within firms, due to incomplete 
contracts. It also strengthens intrinsic motivation as a result of the autonomy of individuals.
6 
 
3. Multiple types of contributors to open source software 
Why should thousands of programmers contribute freely to the provision of a public good? 
Two alternative explanations are discussed. 
•  Is it the result of the collaboration of self-interested individuals who invest in their 
reputation (e.g. Lerner/Tirole 2002a) or who calculate their investment in the open 
source community lower than their personal benefits (e.g. von Hippel 2001, von 
Hippel/von Krogh 2003)?  
•  Is it fun, altruism or prosocial preferences which guide the contributors, as some of 
the leaders of the open source community claim (e.g. Kollock 1999, Raymond 2001, 
Stallman1999, Torvalds 1998)? 
The two alternative explanations refer to a distinction between two kinds of motivation 
(Deci/Ryan 2000, Frey 1997, Osterloh/Frey 2000): Extrinsic motivation works through 
indirect satisfaction of needs, most importantly through monetary compensation. Intrinsic 
                                                 
5 Communities of innovation are comparable to communities of  practice. These are groups of people informally 
bound together by shared expertise and interest (Brown/Duguid 1991, 1998). Virtual communities of practice 
are described by Faraj and Wasko (2001) and Tuomi (2000). 
6 See section 3 on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.     7     
 
motivation works through immediate need satisfaction. An activity is valued for its own sake 
and appears to be self-sustained. The ideal incentive system for intrinsic motivation consists 
in the work contents itself.
7 
Intrinsic motivation has two dimensions. Following Lindenberg (2001), one can 
differentiate between enjoyment-based and obligation-based intrinsic motivation. 
•  Enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation is the incentive focused on by Deci and his 
group (Deci et al. 1999). It refers to a satisfying flow of activity (e.g. 
Csikszentmihalyi 1975) such as playing a game or reading a novel for pleasure. 
•  Obligation-based intrinsic motivation was introduced by Frey (1997) as a further 
important form of incentives. Empirical field evidence for the relevance of obligation-
based rules are tax morale and environmental ethics, or organizational citizenship 
behavior (e.g. Organ 1995).  
We will argue that in the open source community there exist a variety of ideal types of 
contributors with different extrinsic and intrinsic motives.
8 In this section, we will distinguish 
five different types of contributors according to their motives. In reality, these types are 
overlapping (Hars/Ou 2002, Lakhani et al. 2002).  
 
3.1. Commercial service providers  
Commercial service providers make money with open source software in spite of the fact that 
open source software is a public good. The most prominent example is Red Hat. This 
company does not actually sell the source code (which anybody can download from the 
internet for free). Instead, it sells support and services. In addition, it adds value by 
integrating autonomous open source components into a working and reliable operating 
system that can easily be installed by inexperienced users. Other commercial firms like 
Hewlett Packard sell hardware, like printers, and contribute add-ons, like printer drivers, to 
make their products work with open source software. Finally, companies like IBM contribute 
to open source software by making their hardware compatible with it. These firms are 
absolutely vital for the widespread adoption of this kind of software, because the 
                                                 
7 In economics, with the exception of Frey (1997) and more recently Bernabou and Tirole (2002), only a few 
authors deal with intrinsic motivation. Examples are implicit contracts (Akerlof 1982), or norms (Kreps 1997). 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992: 42) admit that the assumption of solely extrinsically motivated people is an 
“extreme caricature”, nevertheless institutions should be designed as if people were entirely selfish.  But this has 
consequences for the crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation, see section 5.  
8 An ideal type is according to Weber (1949) a construct which has been arrived at by the thinking accentuation 
of certain elements of reality. In its conceptual purity, this ideal type cannot be found empirically anywhere in 
reality.    8     
 
inexperienced consumer gets reliable services and add-ons, thus helping to drive these 
programs into the mainstream (Kogut/Metiu 2000).  
 
3.2. Software customizers  
Contributors to open source can gain non-monetary benefits by tailoring the software to their 
own needs (von Hippel 1988, von Hippel/von Krogh 2003). They follow the saying “if you 
want something done right, do it yourself” (Lakhani/von Hippel 2003). They have sufficient 
incentives to contribute to an innovation when they expect the personal benefits to exceed 
their costs.  
Why should the benefits of publishing one’s improvements on the internet exceed the 
costs of revealing information? It is argued that, firstly, publication opens up the possibility 
that other users might work with the amendments of the code, maintain and develop them. 
That includes the elimination of possible errors (e.g. von Hippel 2001, Lerner/Tirole 2002a). 
Secondly, the internet makes it possible for a software developer to access a wide audience 
with very low costs. Because publication costs are small, publication on the internet can pay 
off even if the expectations for helpful comments from other users are relatively low. 
Besides, the gains the developer reaps from the newly developed functionalities are not 
diminished by additional users. 
 
3.3. Reputation investors  
Contributors can make money indirectly by signalling their ability in the open source 
community which can then be turned into money through employment by a commercial 
software company or through easier access to venture capital. Employers or venture 
capitalists can take the reputation of a programmer as a signal for his/her abilities which 
would otherwise be hard to identify. It is argued that in open source projects reputation can 
be more easily made visible than in proprietary projects due to the system of files that list 
people who made contributions, and due to the public nature of mailing list archives 
(Lerner/Tirole 2002a, Moon/Sproull 2000). This system makes open source production 
comparable to the production of research in an academic community where reputation is 
made visible through citations. As in the academic community, strong norms exist regarding 
the public validation of innovative results. 
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3.4. Homo ludens  
While commercial service providers, software customizers and reputation investors are 
extrinsically motivated, much evidence exists that for many programmers the work itself is 
intrinsically rewarding. This idea corresponds to Huizinga`s (1986) homo ludens, the playful 
human that receives some form of benefit simply from carrying out the programming or from 
dealing with a software problem. In that case, contributions to the open source code are not a cost 
but a benefit, not investment but consumption. Important contributors to open source software 
report that they are doing the programming “just for fun” and the public display of one’s abilities 
(Torvalds/Diamond 2001). As Raymond (2001) puts it: „We’re proving not only that we can do 
better software, but that joy is an asset“ (see also Brooks 1995). Writing or debugging software is 
perceived as a „flow experience“ (Csikszentmihalyi 1975). More than 70% of open source 
developers report that they lose track of time while programming (Lakhani et al. 2002). As Ullman 
(1997) shows, programmers often experience a strong personal satisfaction from creating 
“something that works”. This kind of motivation is fostered by voluntary work without time 
pressure (Deci et al. 1999). Creativity and motivation to volunteer in unpaid helping activities are 
higher when the external pressure is low (Stukas et al. 1999, Amabile et al. 2002).  Not being 
subjected to delivery deadlines is an important characteristic of open source projects (Raymond 
2001).  
 
3.5. Members of the tribe 
The open source community is often described as a gift-culture instead of an exchange 
culture (e.g. Raymond 2001). A gift is characterized by receiving no tangible rewards but 
psychological benefits such as the „warm glow“ of sympathy or the satisfaction of living up 
to a moral commitment (Rose-Ackerman 1998). Gift-giving reveals the motivations of 
altruism or generalized reciprocity. Open source contributors report that they like the sense of 
“helping others” or “giving something back” to like-minded others (Faraj/Wasko 2001). 
Norms of generalized reciprocity sustain kindness as a social institution and lead people to 
provide help (Constant et al. 1996). These motivations are apart from transactional exchange 
relationships, because the receiver is often unknown to the giver. Participants report that “the 
person I help may never be in the position to help me, but someone else might be” 
(Rheingold 1993). People seem to reply to the entire group when answering an individual 
question (Wellman/Gulia 1999). The good of the community enters into the preferences of 
the individual contributor. Thus a reciprocal trust based on shared values and on warm    10     
 
feelings towards the group is existing (Rose-Ackerman 2001), rather than trust based on 
encapsulated interests (R. Hardin 2002).  
The belief that it is the right thing to give software away as a common good leads to the 
corollary that private ownership of intellectual property can be damaging.
9 The open source 
movement seems to be fuelled to some extent by the aim to destroy Microsoft’s monopoly 
(e.g. Markus et al. 2000, Raymond 2001). Members of the tribe thus produce a public good of 
two different orders. Firstly, they contribute to the functionality and quality of the programs 
(first order public good). Secondly, they are engaged in keeping the source code open (second 
order public good
10). This includes a heated discussion between various fragments of the 
open source community on what kind of licence best supports these moral concerns. While 
some believe that only the GNU General Public Licence guarantees that source code remains 
open, others feel that the viral effect of this licence actually reduces freedom.  
 
3.6. Complementarity of the different types 
We showed that in the open source community different types of motivation among the 
contributors exist. In the following we argue that these different types do not only coexist but 
are complementary to each other. 
Without intrinsically motivated “fun seekers” and “members of the tribe” open source 
projects would not gain enough momentum to attract extrinsically motivated contributors 
(Bessen 2002, Franck/Jungwirth 2003).  
•  Commercial service providers would lack the basis of their business. They make 
money on support only if the open source software is successful.  
•  Software customizers would have to make higher set up investments so that the costs 
are likely to exceed the benefits. 
•  At the beginning of open source software production reputation investors are not able 
to produce marketable signals. Employers and venture capitalists are only attracted by 
successful projects that have already produced a critical mass of source code. 
                                                 
9 Empirical evidence about the importance of this motive within the open source community is ambivalent. 
According to Ghosh et al. 38% of open source developers report that their motivation to  contribute to  the 
community is their believing in that software should not be a proprietary good (Ghosh et al. 2002). In a different 
survey, Lakhani et al. (2002) find that 11% of open source developers are driven by the motivation to beat 
proprietary software. The difference might be explained by different samples and methodology.  
10 For first and second order public goods see section 4.     11     
 
On the other hand the success of open source software is dependent on extrinsically 
motivated contributors. Commercial players, software customizers or reputation investors 
trigger a leverage effect: 
•  If the open source movement were solely based on intrinsic motivation, the products 
would not be linked the way they are to the needs of the users. A disadvantage over 
commercial development might result. 
•  Inexperienced consumers could not use this kind of software which was originally 
designed by and for experts.  
So far, it is not known which proportion of intrinsically and extrinsically motivated 
people exist. But there are some preliminary empirical findings about what presently drives 
open source programmers and participants of newsgroups. In an empirical study with 
participants of a user-to-user Apache field support system Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) 
report generalized reciprocity as the most agreed-with statement (“I have been helped before, 
so I reciprocate”, “I help now so I will be helped in the future”), followed by identification 
with the community (“I answer to promote open source software”). But these self-reports 
might emphasize “socially correct” answers. The same empirical study found that in one of 
the Usenet newsgroups 57% were free riders (asking questions only), 21% were reciprocators 
(asking questions and giving answers), and 22% could be classified as altruists (providing 
answers only). Taking into account other empirical work one may conclude that extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation exert about the same influence (Ghosh et al. 2002, Hars/Ou 2002).  
 
4. The role of trust in open source communities 
In open source extrinsically and intrinsically motivated contributors work together in a 
complementary manner to produce a public good. In the absence of a central authority that 
has the power to enforce contribution, the presence of extrinsically motivated utility-
maximizers usually leads to an undersupply and overuse of public goods due to free-riding. 
This problem is known in the literature as the social dilemma: Social dilemmas arise if the 
actions of self-interested individuals do not lead to socially desirable outcomes (Dawes 1980, 
Ostrom 1998). The consequence might be a “tragedy of the commons” as Hardin (1968) 
described it, where the public good is not produced at all. But why do we not observe this 
problem in open source? In this chapter we turn to the role of trust and intrinsic motivation in 
overcoming the social dilemma in open source.     12     
 
In open source, the social dilemma is located on different levels. On the first level free 
riding can take place with respect to the production of software itself, because open source 
software constitutes a public good. Since nobody can be excluded from open source software, 
there is a problem of undersupply.
11  
On the second level, the rules of the game have to be observed and sanctioned. The 
worst kinds of free riding on this level are not honouring the terms of the licence, using open 
source components in proprietary commercial products without giving anything back to the 
community or not citing or removing the credits of a contributor. As Raymond (2001) points 
out “surreptitiously filing someone’s name off a project is, in cultural context, one of the 
ultimate crimes”. Reprimanding rule breakers in order to enforce the code of ethics is itself a 
public good and thus constitutes a social dilemma of a higher order: “Punishment almost 
invariably is costly to the punisher, while the benefits from punishment are diffusely 
distributed over all members. It is, in fact, a public good” (Elster 1989: 41).  
As we will show trust is necessary on both levels to enhance cooperation. But what 
form does trust in open source communities take? It is important to note that trust in open 
source communities is rather institutional than personal. The number of participants to a 
given open source project is often very large and the communities are open to exits and new 
entries. Thus the development of trust cannot be based on repeated interactions of the same 
individuals who get to know each other over time and learn to trust each other. Rather, trust 
development in open source communities takes the form of what Meyerson et al. (1996) 
termed swift trust.  
‘Swift trust’ describes a form of trust that is found in teams that only work together for 
a limited period of time and do not have the opportunity to develop trust based on personal 
relationships and mutual control. Members of such temporary teams decide on how much 
they think they can trust the others even before actually joining the team. This decision is 
based on stereotypical social categories and on a subjective appraisal of the intrinsically 
motivated adherence to mutual norms of reciprocity within a community.  
We differentiate between two different types of swift trust: trust based on encapsulated 
interests (R. Hardin 2002) and cognitive trust which is based on knowledge about the 
                                                 
11 In newsgroups this kind of free riding is known as lurking. This means reading ongoing discussions without 
contributing. Lurking is usually not really a problem as long as enough individuals are willing to contribute, 
because there is no rivalry in consumption. But there can exist a rivalry in attention, due to excessive 
crossposting  and trolling. Given the huge amount of information that is transferred, it is critical that contributors 
respect the focus of the problem that is dealt with and therefore avoid crossposting (Kollock/Smith 1996). 
Trolling refers to deliberately posting messages with no other aim than to provoke other users.    13     
 
characteristics of the trustees, e. g. their dominating (intrinsic or extrinsic) motivation 
(Lewicki/Bunker 1995). Trust based on encapsulated interests means that I trust somebody 
because I believe it is in the trustee’s (i.e. the trusted person’s) best personal interest not to 
deceive my trust. This kind of trust is based on an estimation of the situation in which an 
interaction takes place. Given this specific situation, do I believe that the other person has 
enough incentives to behave trustworthy? Cognitive trust, on the other hand, is based on an 
estimation of the characteristics of the person I interact with. Do I believe that a person will 
honour my trust even if it would be in their best personal interest not to do so? In the open 
source context cognitive trust means trust that there are a sufficient number of intrinsically 
motivated contributors in a given project. The trustor himself might well be extrinsically 
motivated, i.e. he might contribute to the open source community in an instrumental way.  
The development of trust is especially important for potential new members, because 
they will only be willing to join a project which they believe is able to solve the first and 
second order social dilemmas in a sustainable way. We will now discuss the social dilemmas 
in open source in turn. 
As it turns out, the solution of the first order social dilemma is not a big problem in 
open source. As we showed in chapter 3, contribution to open source projects is not a pure 
public good. The different types of contributors all have individual incentives to participate 
which make the contribution option more worthwhile for them than merely free-riding. This 
holds for extrinsically as well as intrinsically motivated contributors. If enough people with 
sufficient individual incentives exist, the social dilemma is transformed into a coordination 
game where more than one equilibrium exists (Sen 1974). In a coordination game, the 
production of a public good mainly depends on the estimation of potential contributors, how 
many others will contribute as well. This is equivalent to saying that the contribution decision 
depends on the amount of trust based on encapsulated interests, i.e. the belief that it is in the 
personal interest of a sufficient number of other potential contributors to participate. 
But even on this level trust based on encapsulated interests alone is not enough. As we 
showed in chapter 3.6., especially in the beginning phase of a project, success depends on the 
intrinsic motivation of a sufficient number of participants. This means that also on the level 
of the first order social dilemma, cognitive trust in the intrinsically motivated trustworthiness 
of a relevant part of the community is essential.  
Potential new members can estimate the trustworthiness of a community simply by 
observing its behaviour. Due to the publicity of the internet they are able to judge whether 
norms of generalized reciprocity are lived up to within a community before deciding to join.    14     
 
For example they can observe whether members offer mutual support, provide helpful 
remarks to each other and answer questions in newsgroups.  
Thus the first order social dilemma in open source can be solved even in the presence 
of purely extrinsically motivated trustors. Unfortunately, this kind of cooperation is rather 
unstable. As soon as golden opportunities arise, self-interest maximizing egoists cannot be 
counted on their cooperation anymore. This is the reason why the enforcement of cooperation 
rules is so important. They protect the community from exploitation by opportunists who face 
a golden opportunity.  
Second order social dilemmas of rule enforcement can be solved without a central 
authority if a sufficient number of obligation-based intrinsically motivated people exist who 
are prepared to punish rule-breakers even if such punishment is costly to them. Laboratory 
empirical evidence for the existence of such people can be found in one-shot public good 
games (Camerer/Fehr 2003, Ledyard 1995). In the open source community, these sanctions 
take place by violently blaming individuals on the internet, called “flaming”. Flaming is not 
simply a way of punishing rule-breakers, but also has an expressive function in assuring users 
that others are doing their part in using the public good wisely (Kollock/Smith 1996).
12 Other 
sanctions are the public announcement of ‘kill-filing’ (stating that one doesn’t want to receive 
mails from a specific person) or shunning (deliberately refusing to respond). 
Monitoring the behavior of participants is often easy in the open source community 
because the internet gives full transparency
13. Sanctioning, however, is more of a challenge. 
Firstly, many sanctions (like flaming) are informal in nature. Secondly, the community 
members are often anonymous and no clear group and resource boundaries exist. Insofar the 
conditions in open source communities are different from the communities Ostrom (1990) 
has analysed. She argues that only if clearly defined group and resource boundaries exist, self 
governance of the commons can be successful. Nevertheless in the open source community 
self governance works. It is reported that sanctions have a significant effect on behaviour 
(Kollock/Smith 1996) though these sanctions often do no actual harm but only induce shame. 
In these cases, one has to assume that not only the sanctioner, but also the sanctioned person 
must be intrinsically committed to obligation-based rules. Purely extrinsically motivated 
egoists would not feel any shame (Elster 1999, Orr 2001). It can be concluded that to solve 
                                                 
12 This is especially important for potential new contributors who, before deciding to contribute, need to 
estimate whether they can trust in the stability of a community.  
13 With the exception of illegally including open source code in proprietary programs. 
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the second order social dilemma in open source software production intrinsically motivated 
trustees are needed. 
Again, potential new members judge the trustworthiness of a community by observing 
its behaviour.  
If the existence (though to a different extent) of enjoyment based and obligation based 
intrinsic motivation is a precondition for swift trust and the complementary interaction of the 
different types of contributors to open source software, the question arises, under which 
conditions the required amount of intrinsic motivation and trust can exist and be maintained.  
 
5. The antecedents of swift trust in open source projects 
We showed that different kinds of trust are needed on the trustor’s and the trustee’s side. On 
the trustor’s side, extrinsically motivated trust based on encapsulated interests is sufficient. In 
contrast, on the trustee’s side, there must exist a sufficient number of intrinsically motivated 
contributors as a precondition for the development of swift trust on the trustor’s side. The 
problem therefore boils down to the question, under what conditions the trustor will judge the 
probability that a sufficient amount of intrinsic motivation exists and can be maintained as 
high. We identify two antecedents: Firstly, institutions must be created that ensure that the 
existing intrinsic motivation of the trustees is not destroyed. Secondly, even intrinsically 
motivated members will not contribute to a public good if the costs of doing so are high. Thus 
keeping the contribution costs low is the second antecedent of swift trust. We then go on to 
show that state intervention can disturb the equilibrium between intrinsically and extrinsically 
motivated contributors by turning low cost into high cost situations.   
 
5.1. The institutional level: Initial intrinsic motivation must not be crowded out 
It is hard to analyze the reasons why people develop an initial sense of fun for or a 
commitment to certain projects. But we know the institutional conditions under which initial 
intrinsic motivation is crowded out (undermined) or crowded in (strengthened) by external 
interventions (Frey/Osterloh 2002). Two conditions are relevant for the required institutional 
governance mechanisms to foster the new innovation model: self-determination (1) and 
conditional cooperation (2). 
1)  Self-determination: External interventions crowd out intrinsic motivation if the 
individuals affected perceive them to be controlling. In that case self-determination and self-
esteem suffer and the individuals react by shifting their “locus of causality” from inside to 
outside. In contrast, intrinsic motivation is crowded in if a person’s feelings of self-   16     
 
determination are enhanced. (Deci/Ryan 2000; for a comprehensive overview over the 
empirical evidence see Frey/Jegen 2001). 
In open source projects self determination is enhanced for two reasons. Firstly, 
contributors choose for themselves where and what they wish to contribute (Benkler 2002; 
for empirical evidence see von Krogh et al. 2002). Secondly, a variety of self governance 
mechanisms give contributors large possibilities to participate in collective decision making 
in a transparent way. Extensive experimental and field research show that civic virtues are 
strengthened by procedural utility (Benz et al. 2003, Frey/Stutzer 2002, Osterloh et al. 2002) 
and that “organizational citizenship behavior” is strengthened by participation and procedural 
fairness (e.g. Organ/Ryan 1995). Though governance rules in open source projects differ to a 
great extent (for an overview see Markus et al. 2000), open source contributors submit 
themselves voluntarily to these rules without any contract.  
2) Conditional cooperation: Empirical evidence shows that many individuals contribute 
voluntarily to public goods in social dilemmas as long as some other individuals contribute 
also. They are conditional cooperators (Fischbacher et al. 2001, Levi 1988, Ostrom 2000). 
KDE (K Desktop Environment) gives an impressive example of how conditional cooperation 
can be undermined. KDE is a Windows-like desktop for Linux and other open source 
operating systems developed by the open source community. It is based on a graphical 
interface toolkit called Qt. Qt was developed by Trolltech, a commercial software firm. It did 
not comply with the requirements of open source (Stallman 1999). Even though the Linux 
community agreed that KDE was a technically excellent product, many members refused to 
endorse it because they didn’t agree with the terms of the Qt licence. These members started 
a parallel project called GNOME that is distributed under copyleft. Finally Trolltech 
reluctantly relicensed their product. By now Qt is available under a copyleft license.  
Two consequences to maintain conditional cooperation follow. Firstly, intrinsic 
motivation is crowded out by free riders. Therefore institutional governance mechanisms 
must be set in place which hinder exploitation of voluntary donors. Open source licences, in 
particular copyleft, are such institutional mechanisms (Franck/Jungwirth 2003). They impose 
to contributors as well as to free riders what Hansmann (1980) calls the nondistribution 
constraint which is characteristic for non profit organizations (Rose-Ackerman 1996): 
Voluntary contributions cannot be redistributed among those who have a main impact on the 
organization. The nondistribution constraint is a major institutional precondition for 
voluntary donations to organizations. It is the reason why institutions like the Red Cross or 
most universities are governed as non profit organizations. Also for commercial providers    17     
 
who are dependent on the goodwill of the developers, it is crucial to commit credibly to the 
nondistribution constraint and not to appropriate the joint project in an unfair manner 
(Franck/Jungwirth 2003). Otherwise conditional cooperation breaks down and their business 
model will fail (Benkler 2002). 
Red Hat has submitted itself voluntarily to constraints beyond the obligations of the 
open source license to strengthen conditional cooperation: As mentioned, Red Hat does not 
sell the Linux code. Instead, it sells support, services and value added by assembling and 
testing a running operating system that is compatible with other products carrying the same 
brand. After a short while, other CD-ROM distributors were advertising the same CD-ROM 
for a considerably lower price than Red Hat charged for its product. Even if Red Hat does not 
own intellectual property rights on the entire source code distributed on their CD-ROM, they 
do have the copyright on parts of the CD. How did Red Hat react? The somewhat astonishing 
answer is: not at all. The managers of Red Hat argued that the norms of the open source 
community precluded any claim on property rights on their product. Since Red Hat is 
dependent on the goodwill of the open source community, it adheres to rules which foster 
conditional cooperation.  
Secondly, intrinsic motivation is crowded out if the existing rules of cooperation in a 
public good situation, e.g. the rules of nondistribution, are disregarded. Therefore rule 
breaking must be hindered. Rule breaking can be made more difficult if costs for monitoring 
and sanctioning are low. As mentioned, monitoring in open source software production is 
easy due to the publicity of the internet. Also, sanctioning by flaming or kill-filing is a low 
cost activity. But it seems reasonable to assume that in particular anonymous defectors are 
not vulnerable by sanctions. In these cases, sanctioning is only insofar effective as defectors 
in the open source community still feel a minimum of intrinsically motivated shame. Because 
informal graduated sanctions have a strong expressive function, they are very suitable not to 
crowd out shame by alienating people from the community (Kollock/Smith 1996, Orr 2001, 
Ostrom 1990).  
 
5.2. Low cost situations: Economy of virtue 
Why does production flourish in open source projects based on the intrinsic motivation of 
many people? Why do other fields like the pharmaceutical or bio-medical industry not apply 
this model? The simple answer is that this production model only works in situations in 
which the benefits exceed the costs. This is also true for intrinsic benefits. Even among 
intrinsically motivated donators, martyrs and saints are in short supply. Donators are more    18     
 
willing to contribute if the private opportunity costs are not too high (Rose-Ackerman 2001: 
553), thus “economizing on virtue” (Ackerman 1993: 198). According to North (1990: 43) 
there is a downward sloping demand curve for moral concerns. The more costly it gets, the 
less people contribute. On the other hand, if there exists a low cost situation, many people 
contribute small bits to the public good so that the total amount of contributions rises 
considerably (Kirchgässner 1992, Kliemt 1982).  
We distinguish two different aspects: The costs and benefits of actually producing the 
code and the costs and benefits of revealing it to the community. Even though these aspects 
are intermingled, we will now consider them in turn. 
1) For the actual production of the source code, two conditions which are often found 
in system product industries are beneficial for the cost/benefit ratio, namely sequential 
and complementary innovation processes (Bessen/Maskin 2000, Somaya 2003).  
•  Sequential means that each successive invention builds on the preceding one, in 
particular that there are incremental, not radical steps of innovation. This allows 
users and contributors to amortize their initial investments in project specific 
human capital over several rounds of innovation, thus keeping costs low.
14  
•  Innovation is complementary if several inventors, by following somewhat 
different research lines, enhance the overall probability that a certain problem is 
solved or, more generally, an innovation arises. This can be explained by 
internal dynamic economies of scales alongside trajectories, which help to 
concentrate successful search to a narrow field. Thus, if the efforts of an actor 
further the chances of discovery sufficiently, potential benefits are enhanced and 
this actor has an incentive to contribute to the process of discovery even if, in 
principle, she could wait until someone else makes the invention. The impact of 
such trajectories is of greater weight during the period of exploration than 
during exploitation (March 1991), because in that period uncertainty is more 
important. 
2. Software is an area where the monetary costs of revealing innovations compared to 
the benefits are often quite low. There are two kinds of monetary costs to be considered. 
Firstly, costs of diffusion are low. Participants simply post their contributions on the 
appropriate internet site. Secondly, the losses stemming from sharing intellectual 
                                                 
14 Von Krogh et al. (2002) studied the process of joining an open source project empirically, using the example 
of Freenet. They show that this joining process takes quite some time.     19     
 
property rights by using an open source license are often low compared to the gains 
from the expected feedback by other participants.  
In low cost situations, chances that many people are sufficiently intrinsically motivated 
to contribute their bit to the first and second order public goods are higher. Trustors have 
more reason to believe that the social dilemmas on both levels will be solved within a 
community. In the next section we show that state intervention may well turn low into high 
cost situations, thus undermining the necessary antecedents of both trust based on 
encapsulated interests and cognitive trust in the intrinsically motivated trustworthiness of a 
sufficient number of contributors. 
 
5.3. The impact of state regulation: Turning low cost into high cost situations 
As we showed, open source software production challenges conventional economists' 
wisdom that innovations are better supported the more they are protected by private 
intellectual property rights (e.g. North 1981). We showed that in many open source projects 
the problem of underprovision seems to have been overcome by a complex interplay of 
extrinsically and intrinsically motivated contributors.
15 This interplay depends on the one 
hand on institutions that do not crowd out intrinsic motivation and on the other hand on low 
cost situations which keep the costs of intrinsically motivated moral behaviour within 
reasonable limits. However, state intervention could very well damage the future success of 
this new innovation model.  
Software production is an example of collective production in which private property 
rights might even cause a “tragedy of the anti-commons” (Heller 1998, Heller/Eisenberg 
1998). If property rights on a resource are scattered among many parties and the transaction 
costs to bundle the property rights are too high, this resource is prone to underuse.
16 In the 
case of intellectual property rights exclusion is made possible by patents. While patents are 
intended to further innovation by enabling innovators to collect the rents on their investment, 
in some cases they are used solely to block competitors from using an innovation.  
                                                 
15 In open source software production, the problem of overuse does not occur since there is no rivalry in 
consumption. Additional users can even generate positive external network effects. 
16 An example of how privatisation in postsocialist economies can trigger a “tragedy of the anti-commons” was 
given by Heller (1998). He started by asking why several years after the transition “from Marx to markets” 
storefronts often remain empty while small kiosks full of goods mushroom on the streets. He argues that the 
problem is not primarily a lack of clearly defined property rights, corruption, or disobedience of the law, but the 
way government scatters property rights rather than creating coherent bundles of rights.    20     
 
New software is usually based on existing programs and develops them further. Some 
authors even go as far as to state that software development today is impossible without 
infringement of intellectual property held by some other party (Bessen 2002).  
For open source software production, the potential effects of patent protection are even 
worse than in proprietary software production for several reasons. Firstly, since open source 
software developers cannot make money with their programs as such, they simply cannot 
afford to stand up in legal fights about patent infringements (Bessen 2002).
17  Secondly, 
especially in systems product industries like the computer and software industry, patents can 
be used to strengthen one’s bargaining power in the case that some other party wants to block 
access to its own patents. Systems product industries are characterized by the fact that their 
products incorporate numerous inventions made by other parties. Since access to others’ 
patents is essential, firms can build up patent portfolios to have something valuable to offer in 
exchange. Somaya (2003) tested this empirically and found evidence for this behaviour in the 
computer industry. In open source projects by definition it is impossible to build up such 
bargaining power. If a patent holder chooses to sue for infringement, open source projects 
have nothing to offer in exchange for an out of court settlement. The resulting “patent 
thickets” threaten the ability of open source developers to improve software (Bessen 2002). 
Thirdly, the option to patent software rather than simply having the copyright on the source 
may simply increases opportunity costs, thus turning low cost into high cost situations.  
When faced with situations where such a tragedy of the anti-commons could arise, 
governments should not blindly apply orthodox market economics by increasing the scope 
and sophistication of regulations for private appropriation of intellectual property rights. 
Regulators should spend their efforts providing tools which help to avoid the “tragedy of the 
anti-commons” rather than supplanting copyright protection, on which the viability of the 
new innovation model depends, with patent protection (Benkler 2002).  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Open source software production is a highly successful innovation model. But it is, by far, 
not a singular case but rather one example of “virtual communities of innovation”. The 
purpose of this paper is to inquire under which conditions the new innovation model might 
work in general.  
                                                 
17 So far only a few open source developers have been sued for patent infringement (Bessen 2002). Still the 
potential threat must not be neglected.     21     
 
We argued that, for this innovation model to work, different kinds of motivations and 
trust are needed to overcome the social dilemmas in public good production. The first order 
public good is open source software of high quality. The second order public good is 
necessary to maintain conditional cooperation and generalized trust of the benevolent 
contributors.  Extrinsically motivated participants only contribute to the first order public 
good in an instrumental way. Their aim is to tailor the products to their own needs, to invest 
in their reputation for monetary purposes or to enlarge the user base for their complementary 
products. They can only be trusted to contribute as long as it is in their best personal interest 
to do so. Intrinsically motivated members on the other hand contribute to the first and the 
second order public good. Intrinsic motivations are twofold, enjoyment-based (fun, public 
display of ones abilities) and obligation based (following norms of generalized reciprocity). 
Without these intrinsically motivated contributors cooperation in open source software is not 
sustainable since only their efforts safeguard the community against exploitation by purely 
self-interest maximizing opportunists in the presence of a golden opportunity. Thus, potential 
new members will only join a community if they can build cognitive trust that there exist a 
sufficient number of intrinsically motivated members who are willing to contribute to the 
public goods even if the costs should exceed their personal benefits.   
Thus the trustworthiness of a community depends on the amount of intrinsic motivation 
of a relevant part of its members. We identified two conditions that make the presence of this 
kind of motivation more likely: Institutional arrangements that do not crowd out intrinsic 
motivation and low cost situations. 
On the institutional level, licences like copyleft seem to be a good solution to foster the 
conditional cooperation of intrinsically motivated contributors on the one hand and serve the 
interests of extrinsically motivated investors on the other hand (Franck/Jungwirth 2003). 
Nevertheless, it seems to be important that the commercial providers commit themselves to 
the norms of the open source community beyond the obligations of the open source licence. 
As a consequence, companies like Red Hat submit themselves voluntarily to constraints 
beyond copyleft to maintain conditional cooperation in the community. 
Low cost situations foster trust by making intrinsically motivated contributions to the 
public goods more likely, thus strengthening the trustworthiness of the community. Thus, 
situational and motivational factors are highly interlinked.  
Low cost situations also explain why private ownership of intellectual property rights is 
sometimes inefficient. Private ownership of intellectual property among independent 
suppliers is less efficient in low-cost situations, (a) characterized by incremental and    22     
 
complementary innovations or (b) whenever concurrence of design and testing is crucial. In 
these cases, owners have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource while no one has an 
efficient right to use it. This condition not only holds in software production but also in other 
peer productions of intellectual goods (Benkler 2002). It does not hold in situations (e.g. in 
the pharmaceutical industry) where testing and market launching demand high investments. 
Further empirical research is needed to shed light on the quantitative dimension of this 
situational factor.  
Even though this new innovation model is based on self-regulation in the absence of a 
central authority, state intervention in the form of a strengthening of intellectual property 
rights could very well damage its success. Patent protection can not only reduce the room in 
which these self-governed institutions can flourish, thus reducing self determination. They 
also turn low cost into high cost situations and therefore diminish individual willingness to 
contribute to the public good.  
To conclude, though we are far from fully understanding the interplay between 
motivational, situational, and institutional factors which make this new innovation model 
work, open source software production shows that even in virtual communities with no clear 
cut boundaries, under certain conditions trust and trustworthiness can flourish.      23     
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